WW2
Your World War II Resource
Encyclopedia
MDSWW-- The Macmillan Dictionary of the Second World War
OCWW2--The Oxford Companion to World War II
OEGWW2--The Oxford Essential Guide to World War II
RMEWW2--Rand McNally Encyclopedia of World War II
WW2AVE--World War II: A Visual Encyclopedia
WW2AW--World War II: America at War, 1941-1945

Afrika Korps


or Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAK) was the formation Rommel, then a maj-general, commanded tactically from February to August 1941 in the Western Desert campaigns. From August 1941 to March 1943 it was always the spearhead of his several larger commands (Panzer Group Africa, Panzer Army Africa, and German-Italian Panzer Army), and when he was appointed C-in-C of Army Group Africa in March 1943 it became part of the Italian First Army under General Messe.
The dispatch of a German force to the Western Desert was first discussed in December 1940. Italian defeats prompted Hitler to issue his directive No. 22 on 11 January 1941 ordering the formation of a Sperrverband (special blocking detachment) to bolster the Italian defence of western Libya. To carry out this operation (Sonnenblume), the 5th Light Division was formed and was soon joined by the 15th Panzer Division, and on 3 February Rommel was appointed 'Commander of German Army troops in Africa.' The new formation was officially named the Deutsches Afrika Korps on 19 February 1941, by which time part of the 5th Light Division (renamed 21st Panzer Division, 1 October 1941) had already arrived in Tripoli. Later, various Italian formations were attached to it and it was supported from the air by units detached from 10th Fliegerkorps based in Italy under the command of a Fliegerfuhrer Afrika.
It says much for Rommel's powers of leadership that the two German divisions initially under his command, which were both hastily formed from an assortment of units, none of them with any desert experience, were welded so soon into a formation with so strong an identity, which quickly became legendary. 'Between Rommel and his troops there was that mutual understanding which cannot be explained and analysed,' wrote one of his staff officers, 'but which is the gift of the gods. The Afrika Korps followed Rommel wherever he led, however hard he drove them.'
Rommel was technically subordinate to the Italian C-in-C in North Africa, and through him to the Italian High Command, but as he had the right to appeal to Berlin his independent command was unfettered by Italian wishes or orders. However, he was hamstrung by several limiting factors: ULTRA intelligence often revealed his plans, though he did not always follow them; his supply line during the battle for supremacy in the Mediterranean was always threatened and frequently disrupted; his main port, Tripoli, was inadequate; and Hitler and his subordinates, absorbed in greater events elsewhere, viewed the Western Desert as no more than a holding campaign.
The tactics of the DAK reversed the generally accepted contemporary theory that tanks were best employed to destroy other tanks before penetrating the infantry's lines to attack the rear areas. Rommel stood this principle on its head by using an anti-tank gun line to destroy the oncoming armour, enabling his tanks to deal with opposing infantry. These tactics were employed during the British offensive (Battleaxe) of June 1941. They resulted in a victory for the DAK which did much to create the pride and self-confidence that marked its later battles and it remained a formidable force throughout Rommel's time in the western desert and in the North African campaign. It was a DAK Assault Group which was largely responsible for his victory at the Kasserine Pass in February 1943 and it was one of the last units to surrender in Tunisia, when, just before midnight on 12 May 1943, its commander signalled: 'Ammunition shot off. Arms and equipment destroyed. In accordance with order received Afrika Korps has fought itself to conditions where it can fight no more. The German Afrika Korps must rise again. Heia Safari!'
Heia Safari was the DAK's Swahili warcry. Meaning 'Let's go get 'em' or Tallyho!', it prove entirely appropriate. [OCWW2]

Agency Africa
Franco-Polish intelligence network which was also known as Agency Rygor after its leader, Major (later Maj-General) Rygor Slowikowski, who escaped to France after the end of the Polish campaign in October 1939. He formed an intelligence network in France and in July 1941 was ordered by the Polish government-in-exile to start one in French North Africa. Unknown to him initially, his orders were in fact coming from, and his intelligence going to, MI6 (though it was later channeled through the Office of Strategic Services). His territory was vast, from the Libyan-Tunisian border to French West Africa but, posing as a wealthy porridge-making businessman and using Algiers as a base, he organized nine outposts in Algeria, Tunisia, French Morocco, and Dakar in French West Africa. His intelligence officers were Polish but his agents were all French. By the time of the North African campaign landings (Torch) in November 1942, for which Agency Africa provided valuable intelligence on ports and airfields and the location of Vichy French military units and installations, it had two radio stations, a counter-intelligence on port, and no fewer than 92 principal agents. After Torch the network was mainly concerned with interrogating Polish prisoners-of-war who had fought for the Germans. Slowikowski was awarded the British OBE and the American Legion of Merit. [OCWW2]

Airborne Army
The First Airborne Army was an Anglo-American command established to control all Allied Airborne forces in the European theater. It was the only organization of its size in history. The First Airborne Army was established on Aug. 2, 1944, under the command of US Lt. Gen. Lewis Brereton, previously commanding general of the US Ninth Air Force. By late 1944 the Army consisted of the British 1st and US XVIII Airborne Corps; they were assigned a total of five airborne divisions, one air transportable division, and one (Polish) airborne brigade.
The First Airborne Army was not employed as a total force. The largest Alleid airborne operation was Market Garden, when three divisions and an airborne brigade were used in a series of airborne landings to capture bridges in Holland in Sept. 1944. In early 1945 Gen. Brereton conceived a plan to capture the Ruhr industrial region by a ten-division airborne assault, code-named Arena. That operation was undertaken, however, on a much smaller scale as Operation Varsity. Several plans were also developed for an airborne assault against Berlin. [WW2AAW]

Airborne Operations
Operations involving the delivery of ground forces by air landing, glider or parachute. The US Army had planned to use parachutists in 1918, but the end of WWI had prevented development of the idea. The Red Army in fact became the first to try out airborne troops in 1927, but their programme lapsed following the execution of its leading proponent, Tukhachevsky, in 1937. Thus, although the Soviets possessed about 100,000 paratroops in 1941, they were hardly used at all in their designated role. The British War Office, informed of Soviet progress by [Sir Archibald] Wavell in 1936, showed no real interest in the field, but in Germany an experimental airborne staff had been set up under [Kurt] Student in 1935, and the 7th Fliegerkorps (Airborne Division) was ready for action by 1939.
German forces had been transported to Austria by air in 1938, and small numbers of paratroops took part in the attacks on Poland and Norway. The first major airborne operation of the war took place in May 1940, when gliders were used for the first time, and a total of 4,000 German troops dropped or landed from 450 aircraft for the invasions of Belgium and the Netherlands. About 8,000 airborne troops were envisaged for the invasion of Britain, and some 11,000 -- including all the Luftwaffe's paratroops -- were involved in the battle for Crete in May 1941. Heavy losses in this operation contributed to Hitler's disenchantment with the concept, and German airborne forces were never again used in an offensive role. Instead, they operated as a highly mobile strike force, dropped into important combat zones but not risked behind enemy lines.
Churchill was a strong advocate of airborne warfare, and General Sir Frederick Browning was given the task of forming a British airborne division in October 1940. The first British paratroops saw action the following February, when 38 of them blew up an aqueduct in Italy. The first US Army battalion of parachutists had been formed in September 1940, and a Provisional Parachute Group was established in 1941. By 1945 the Allies had a total of six airborne divisions (four of them American) as well as several independent brigades (GB) or regiments (US) of paratroops.
The Allied divisions combined glider and parachute forces and were always used en masse -- in the invasions of Sicily and Normandy, for the attack on Arnhem and for the crossing of the Rhine. Smaller-scale units like the SAS were employed to seize or sabotage tactical objectives while still smaller groups of individuals were dropped into Axis occupied territories in aid of resistance groups.
Most airborne operations were confined to the European theatre and relatively little use of airborne forces was made in the Pacific. The US 11th Airborne Division was in the Pacific from 1944, but fought primarily as a ground force, and the Japanese conducted only small-scale operations with their few paratroops. Even in Europe, the pace of ground advances was often so rapid that airborne operations could not be fully planned before their objectives were overrun.
The main advantage of paratroops was the speed with which they could be deployed on long-range operations. Their major weaknesses were their vulnerability while in the air and their dependence on good supply routes once in position. Without these, their light, purpose-designed equipment was no match for that of conventional ground forces. By the end of the war, all sides had concluded that major offensive airborne operations were prohibitively complex and costly. [MDSWW]

Air Commando
Officially called No. 5318 Air Force Unit of the US Army Air Forces, which was commanded by Colonel Philip Cochran. Formed to support and supply the second operation of the Chindits during the Burma campaign in March 1944, it transported two Chindit brigades behind Japanese lines in gliders. Its strength included 30 fighters, 12 bombers, 225 gliders, 100 light aircraft, and 6 helicopters. Withdrawn in May 1944, it was later used to transport supplies and troops over the Hump from India to China. [OCWW2]

Aircraft Carriers
When the United States went to war, the US Navy possessed seven fleet carriers (CVs). Two, Lexington and Saratoga, had been built on the hulls of battle cruisers, and with a displacement of almost 34,000 tons were the largest ships in the fleet. None of the other five was larger than 18,000 tons. Under construction were the first of the Essex-class aircraft carriers, which displaced 24,500 tons and would begin joining the fleet in 1942. Because their flight decks were not armored, protection having been sacrificed for speed and carrying capacity, all were capable of speeds in excess of 30 knots. The older carriers held about 70 warplanes, whereas Essex-class carriers had room for more than 100.
Before the war most admirals had believed that battleships would continue to be the decisive weapons of naval warfare. Carriers were seen as auxiliaries that would scout ahead of the battle line, achieve air superiority, attack enemy ships, and perform other useful services. But Pearl Harbor and Midway established the carrier's primacy. Thereafter, battleships served as auxiliaries.
Because the carriers of the Pacific Fleet were heavily outnumbered by those of Japan, an emergency class of nine light carriers (designated CVL) were built on cruiser hulls and entered service in 1943. Although they carried about 30 aircraft apiece, they were as fast as the fleet carriers and fought alongside them.
A third type, the small escort or "jeep" carrier (designated CVE), proved vitally important to the war effort. The first few of these escorts were built on the hulls of cargo ships, but the later classes were designed as carriers from the keel up. They ranged from 7,000 to 17,000 tons in size and could carry up to 36 aircraft, but their slow speed made them unusable in fleet actions.
Airplanes based on escort carriers became the most effective antisubmarine weapons, though land-based aircraft and surface warships remained important. This was Roosevelt's doing, for if Admiral Ernest J. King had gotten his way, there would not have been enough escort carriers to go around. King favored CVs, so that in June 1942 when the industrialist Henry J. Kaiser proposed building 30 escort carriers, the Navy rejected his offer. Kaiser had enough clout that he did not have to take no for an answer. He went directly to Roosevelt, who reversed the decision. In time Kaiser's shipyards would be producing one of these ships every week. Escort carriers were immensely valuable to the Allies and, thanks to Roosevelt, they joined the fleet when most needed.
Deadly hunter-killer groups were built around the escort carrier groups that played havoc with German Admiral Doenitz's U-boats. In the Pacific they were useful too, providing close support to amphibious troops from inshore waters, where the fleet carriers cared not go. Ultimately even King recognized their value and they were built in large numbers, especially the Casablanca class, of which 49 were launched. In the Battle of Leyte Gulf, escort carriers would engage a Japanese battleship force and save the invasion fleet.
The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy were the only other services besides the US Navy with large carrier fleets. Japanese carriers were constructed along the same lines as those of the US Navy: big, fast, lightly armored, carrying large air groups. The British carriers were different, having heavily armored flight decks and smaller air groups -- no more than 60 aircraft. Although both Japan and the United States equipped their carriers with modern single-wing aircraft, Britain entered the war with obsolete planes. The Swordfish, its primary torpedo bomber, was a slow biplane similar in appearance to those used in World War I. Fortunately for the Swordfish, neither Germany nor Italy possessed any usable aircraft carriers, which made it possible for Swordfish to help sink the Bismarck and destroy three Italian battleships at anchor. The Royal Navy contributed a carrier task force equipped with modern aircraft to the Battle of Okinawa. Thanks to their armored flight decks they stood up to the Japanese suicide attacks, while eight thin-skinned US carriers had to be withdrawn from combat when their flight decks were penetrated by kamikazes. [OEGWW2]

Air Defence of Great Britain
(ADGB), pre-war command abolished in 1936 when it was replaced by various commands named by function. However, it continued to be used occasionally in connection with the relations between C-in-C Fighter Command and those air defences -- such as anti-aircraft guns -- which were provided by the army but controlled by Fighter Command. The title was resurrected in November 1943 when Allied fighter forces were reorganized for the Normandy landings in June 1944. As part of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force the ADGB comprised five fighter groups which were commanded by Air Marshal Roderic Hill who also controlled all anti-aircraft guns, barrage balloons, and searchlights. These groups were responsible for the defence not only of the UK but of the English Channel while the invasion was taking place, and of the initial lodgement area in Normandy. [OCWW2]

Air Gap (Mid-Atlantic)
Area south of Greenland in which Allied convoys could not be given air cover against U-boat attacks during much of the battle of the Atlantic. It was therefore ideal for the operation of Admiral Donitz's wolf-packs, though aircraft launched from merchant ships, and later escort carriers, were used to try to cover it. Until May 1941 air cover was very limited but from that month land-based aircraft began operation 965 km. (600 mi.) eastwards from Newfoundland, 645 km. (400 mi.) southwards from Iceland, and 1,125 km. (700 mi.) westwards from Northern Ireland. However, this still left a 480 km. (300 mi.) gap south of Greenland where merchant shipping losses continued to be high. A decision at the Casablanca conference in January 1943 to cover this with additional very long range Liberator bombers was not implemented as they were badly needed for use in the Pacific war and the strategic air offensive against Germany. However, a recommendation by the Washington Convoy conference, held in March 1943, that 20 be supplied to the Royal Canadian Air Force to cover the gap, was heeded, and by the end of May sufficient were operating to close it.
Until January 1943, there was also a gap east of the Azores, which affected the Gibraltar and West African convoys, another west of the Azores, and another in the South Atlantic. The one west of the Azores was called the "Black Pit" by the Germans because they sank so many ships there, but it was eventually closed when air bases in the Azores were opened in October 1943. [OCWW2]

Air-Sea Rescue
All sides used aircraft for sea rescue purposes in WW2, and the practice was first begun on a large scale by British and German forces in 1940. The Luftwaffe employed some veteran floatplanes for the task, and the British sent out Westland Lysander liaison planes (with fighter escort) to drop rubber rafts to airmen downed in the Channel during Battle of Britain engagements. Pick-ups were mostly performed by motor boats. German air-sea rescue in the region remained the prerogative of the Luftwaffe and many of their innovations -- such as one-man dinghies for fighters and yellow water-marker dye for spotting -- were copied by the British, who set up an Air-Sea Rescue Service early in 1941. This had no aircraft of its own but concentrated on liaison and co-ordination between naval and air-force units (the RAF controlled British coastal aircraft throughout the war). In June 1943, USAAF forces in England introduced their own system specifically for the theatre, which made much greater use of aircraft. P-47 fighter-bombers spotted liferafts and protected the rescue craft, while converted B-17 bombers patrolled the area dropping liferafts. The rescue craft itself was frequently a US Navy flying boat. British experience contributed to the formulation of this system, and in the Mediterranean all Allied air-sea remained under British organizational control. Elsewhere, in theatres dominated by United States forces, air-sea rescue remained a matter of co-ordination between the individual army and navy commands and a unified overall air-sea rescue command was never created by the United States. [MDSWW]

Airships
The loss of the mighty German airship Hindenburg in 1937 and other major airship disasters in the 1920s and 1930s completely discredited this means of transportation, but the US Navy was an exception to the rule and maintained an interest in airships. However, little money was allocated and there were only ten non-rigid airships on strength at the time of Pearl Harbor .... After Pearl Harbor authorization was given to build five Atlantic coast airship stations and three Pacific coast stations, with an increase to 200 airships. Eventually there were US Navy airship bases, too, in Brazil, Trinidad, and French Morocco, the latter having "satellite" bases all round the Mediterranean area including the Azores, Malta, Bizerta and Venice all from early 1944 onwards. For the last year of the war two US Navy airships patrolled the Straits of Gibraltar every night. The US Navy Airships (popularly called Blimps), were helium-filled non-rigids and consisted of the "L" class (150 ft. long), the "M" class (287 ft. long) and the "K" class (251.7 ft. long). All blimps could carry a bomb load (4 x 325 lb "K", and 8 x 325 lb. "M") and a Browning MG. Blimps were mainly used as convoy escorts, but they were also used for locating drifting survivors and also as mine spotters working with minesweepers. They could fly as low as 50 ft. above the water .... Only one blimp was shot down, K-74, when her bombs hung up as she attacked a U-boat on the surface at night on 18 July 1943. It was planned to base a US Navy blimp squadron in southwest England in 1945 to patrol the Western Approaches, but the war ended before the blimps left the United States. [WW2AVE]

Air Transport Auxiliary
British civilian organization which flew aircraft from the factories to their air bases. Of 1,152 male and 166 female pilots, some of them American, many of whom were trained at its flying schools, 98 men and 15 women lost their lives. Altogether it delivered 308,567 aircraft at an annual loss rate that never exceeded 0.39%. [OCWW2]